arborg.se – Research Methodology and Applications
Bo Strangert (RD10)
Choice of perspectives on counteracting collateral damage.
A fictitious case of planning command and control systems
Is it possible to improve initial project planning by a careful choice of the initial perspective of the task? Some recent notes on this question are found in RD7, RD8, RD9 on this website, arborg.se. The suggestions point to the need of continuing a free choice of opportunities during further planning, while still retaining an ultimate project goal. In particular, this is important when dealing with complex tasks.
In summary, the proposal is to make preliminary theoretical specifications of alternative perspectives of planning. Contrasting the alternatives makes it possible to explore the outcome space, derive hypothetical consequences, and make preparatory theoretical and empirical tests of options.
The approach was recently illustrated by an analytical review of a case study about the design of methods of supervision (reported in RD9 and T19). The present fictitious case is a further illustration of the theme concerning the preliminary theoretical specification.
Formulation of the project goal of the case
The project to be planned is about the prevention and reduction of collateral damage in connection with missions. Possible missions include military operations and rescue operations but also environmental actions, construction tasks, and more. ’Collateral damage’ means unintended damage to people and infrastructure when conducting missions.
An example of a military definition of ’collateral damage’ is: ”Unintentional or incidental injury or damage to persons or objects that would not be lawful military targets in the circumstances ruling at the time. Such damage is not unlawful so long as it is not excessive in light of the overall military advantage anticipated from the attack.” (US DoD, 2010/11) cited and commented upon in arborg.se/Applied Research Methods for Development Projects.
As this military application implies, there may be a conflict between conducting targeted activities and respecting ethical or other demands. The issue of balancing or coordinating different objectives was illustrated in the case study of supervision methodology, RD 9. That problem was about how to integrate work environment considerations into the management of production.
Suppose that some organization has ordered a team to manage a project about the prevention of collateral damage in some risky businesses. The commission allows possibilities but also restrictions on the project; a broad outline about restrictions and how to handle them has been commented in RD3 and RD4. The project team’s interpretation of the goal and its associated prescriptions offers the first opportunity to make some theoretical considerations.
Suppose the following set of requirement specifications constitutes the prescribed foundations of the task of designing a means for preventing and reducing collateral damage. They are supposed to be the result of preparatory planning about the project goal and its accomplishment. (Actually, it is an adapted version of rules for systematic work environment management, ASF 2001:1.)
________
Scope of the requirements
These requirements apply to all commanders (managers) of operations.
Definition of Command and Control of Collateral Damage
Command and collateral of collateral damage mean the work done by the commander to investigate, carry out and follow up activities in such a way that collateral damage is prevented or reduced so that a satisfactory operative environment is achieved.
Requirements
There shall be routines describing how aspects of collateral damage shall be handled.
The commander shall make sure that the persons assigned these control tasks are sufficient in number and have the authority and the resources that are needed. The commander shall also make sure that they have sufficient knowledge of
– rules with significance for preventing and reducing collateral damage,
– physical, psychological and social conditions implying risks of collateral damage,
– measures to prevent and reduce collateral damage, and
– conditions which contribute to a satisfactory operative environment.
The commander shall make sure that those assigned the tasks have sufficient competence for the conduct of a well-functioning command and control of collateral damage.
When changes to the activities are being planned, the commander shall assess whether the changes entail risks of collateral damage which may require measurements.
The risk assessment shall be documented in writing. The risk assessment shall indicate which risks are present and whether or not they are serious.
Measures not carried out immediately shall be put in a written action plan. The plan shall indicate when the measures shall be taken and who is responsible for making sure they are carried out.
Measures taken shall be controlled.
The follow-up shall be documented in writing and reported.
________
The set of task requirements has a deliberately general formulation to allow the application to various branches of operations and activities. There are many ways of interpreting the set as a whole.
Alternative interpretations of the set of requirement specifications
Suppose that the project team begins to consider the purpose behind the set of requirements. Obviously, there is a set of rules about a commander’s responsibility of managing collateral damage — that is, a general description of a command and control (C2) system (or management system). The commander’s responsibility is transferred into actions by allocation of tasks to personnel and through task specifications. It is a general system description that may be broadly and flexibly applied to diverse aims and situations.
Consider the following different definitions of the system characteristics, which can be pertinent to a further theoretical specification of type 1-4:
1. A set of rules which each may be treated as a necessary condition or not, regarding a particular mission (operation). Possibly, the set may as a whole be regarded as sufficient under certain circumstances.
2. A closed and fixed system of interconnected rules that outputs conditionally to specific events and indications (input).
3. An open targeted system of interconnected rules that actively works for goal fulfillment.
4. A complex adaptive system in relation to a dynamic and uncertain context.
All four (and still more) definitions could, depending on the context, be used in planning the project of a C2 system for prevention or reduction of collateral damage. For example, even if definition 1 probably is not congruent with a client’s original intention about the commission, a treatment of a system as a set of separate rules could develop as a consequence of practice or incapability of users. An example of such a type of spontaneous simplification is described in RD9.
The differences between definitions 2, 3 and 4 describe an increasing system capability to deal with complex missions and tasks, and consequently, demanding more advanced perspectives on project planning
Elaborating the preliminary theoretical specifications
In line with the previous notations on theoretical specifications (RD7, RD8, RD9, T19), we will elaborate a suitable theoretical platform by contrasting some alternative perspectives. The choice of alternatives is important but cannot be performed routinely. Clearly, it should be made to reflect some kind of outcome space of perspectives, though it is difficult to select its attributes. In the present fictitious case, the selected solution will be to contrast the attributes of systems structure (i.e., interconnectivity of rules) and modes of targeting.
Thus, a possible contrast of interconnectivity is obtained by selecting system definition 1 vs. 2, 3, 4. An interesting contrast of targeting can be 3 vs. 4, or between those two and 2. Clever contrasting of perspectives should open up theoretical possibilities and pave way for consequence analyses and empirical testing. An illustrative outline was presented in RD9 about perspectives on supervision. A similar approach will be followed here for the case of collateral damage.
Three contrasting perspectives on the set of requirement specifications are formulated. They are neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive. Some features of them are stated briefly:
A perspective entails assumptions about a project goal or a set of requirement specifications. Therefore, clarification of assumptions is one main reason for theoretical specification. As intended, the present perspectives differ clearly regarding the structure and implications of the given rule system for C2 of collateral damage. A few brief examples may illustrate latent assumptions about the systems’ capacity, adaptability and feasibility of assessment.
Perspective A is easiest to set up. Rule compliance can be imposed and assessed for single rules or uncomplicated patterns. It is suitable for simple events and isolated indications of collateral damage, but incapable to elucidate and develop complex system structures and tasks. Hence, it is unsuitable for command and control of complex events of collateral damage.
Perspective B assumes that a given system goal and its indicated effects are clearly correlated with antecedent factors, and that the correlation may be used to proactively plan, conduct and assess effects. However, its utility is restricted to known antecedent-effect correlations. Its adaptability to other system demands and contexts is therefore limited.
Perspective C is difficult to conceive and implement, because it presupposes that collateral damage has all qualities of a complex phenomenon. Thus, it seems theoretically appropriate for C2, for example regarding capacity requirements and adaptability. The actual implementation and assessment usually require advanced planning and decision making.
Outline of an application to military operations and police actions
The public focus on political and human consequences of unintended side effects of operations using force increases the demand on decision makers to improve planning of missions. The question is how to consider risks of collateral damage in the regular tactical and strategic planning of military and police operations.
Which are the alternative perspectives of planning, and what about their strengths and weaknesses? In order to simplify the examination, the outline is restricted to briefly exemplify the three abstract perspectives A, B and C in initial project planning.
Perspective A. The intention may be to subsume a special subroutine for C2 to counteract collateral damage under the conduct of primary operations. It could have the status of a standing order to be obeyed during different conditions. The design of the complementary C2 system should include requirement specifications. For example, those general ones stated in the beginning of this paper could be used as prototypes for allocation of tasks, risk assessment, measures and follow-up etcetera. Following the rule system accurately shall prevent collateral damage. This is facilitated offline by surveying and examining common risks and countermeasures as a basis for devising standard orders and induce capability. The complementary C2 system should be prepared by instruction and drill exercises, aimed at a self-regulating counteraction of collateral damage. Hence, the A-perspective aims at rule compliance as a means of preventing collateral damage. Its possible advantage rests upon the assumption that a general rule system, which is established offline, can be used online in various applications.
The A-perspective of designing a complementary system could be the result of a cost-benefit analysis and planning that doesn’t seriously consider the mechanism of prioritizing under stress. When the stakes for own forces are very high, the priority of counteracting collateral damage will be low. The A-perspective has no inbuilt protective solution to such circumstances. Another weakness is that the conceived rule characteristics are not prepared for diversity and uncertainty of conditions. A routine-based approach is inherently vulnerable to situations or operations of great complexity.
Perspective B. In contrast to the A-perspective’s rule-determined onward focus on general preventive actions, the B-perspective reverses the direction of analysis. It starts an examination of possible collateral damage effects, given a particular operation. This examination should be made ahead of any operation to try to take all reasonable effects into account. Against that background an attempt is made to design means to prevent or reduce effects of collateral damage. Therefore, a crucial part of the planning is to identify causal antecedents to risks of collateral damage.
Compared to the A-perspective, B gives a flexible way of adjusting the primary operation to the goal of controlling collateral damage. But it also introduces uncertainty about the priority of this particular goal, and how the goal coordination shall be conducted. Should the risk examination of collateral damage be made continually during planning, or as some fixed risk evaluation attempts? For example, an extreme option is to delay examination until a preliminary plan of operation is completed. Another decision dilemma: What to do about the paucity of reliable causal links between means and effects which are valid in diverse contexts?
The uncertainty of goal priority and causal links between means and effects is acute for online command and control, when unexpected circumstances make it necessary to change tactics or strategy. This is the case to be expected in complex tasks and situations.
Perspective C. As noted before, C is a theoretically justified approach to challenges of complex tasks and situations. The intrinsic complexity of using military or police force in situations with high risks for both own forces and collateral damage puts extremely strong demands on planning and executing command and control — at least from an ideal point of view. Such an insight may well prepare for questioning the underlying reasons for a B-type of perspectives, although no easy and readymade alternatives exist.
One inherent weakness of an effects-based approach seems to be its strong dependence on the goal definition. In many complex cases it can be very difficult and risky to assume that the intended end state is likely or suitable to use as a base for planning. The uncertainty increases when divergent goals are at issue; the problem of prioritizing on an online basis was mentioned in the preceding B-section. Thus, it is desirable to invent means of integrating two disparate processes into one common process-based solution.
An example of a process-based solution is reported in the military case study of URAS (summarized in RD1, a more detailed version in arborg.se/Applied Research Methods for Development Projects). First, a common intelligence function is identified. The combat objective and the need to prevent collateral damage depend both on the availability of qualified information about the situation. Consequently, providing ground forces with improved means for reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition should improve both combat efficiency and the protection of noncombatants and infrastructure. That means design of new technical and tactical means. The solution also allows greater strategic flexibility.
An additional advantage of using the intelligence function as an integrating concept is that it may provide a means to control some otherwise interfering contextual sources. Because most ground operations involve many different units and also air support, the need of coordination is essential. Any change of important tactical and technical means of subunits may therefore interfere, unless the whole network of forces is properly adjusted. One formula is to use intelligence tasks, which have a fundamental coordinative function in network centric warfare. Accordingly, the case study project extends its planning scope to include also the interrelations with air command, as well as with higher strategic command levels. The account in A2 gives more details about the planning perspective.
Conclusion
Any goal or rule system, which is designed for planning and managing programs or operations, has to be interpreted. That is, its assumptions should be scrutinized and its consequences analyzed. The results of the undertaking usually provide different possible ’perspectives’ to be compared in project planning. The present notes about perspectives have exemplified some theoretical and formal aspects. There are of course also other important aspects that should be considered, notably methodological and cognitive-organizational ones. They are different but complementary domains of reflections.
References
AFS 2001:1. Systematic Work Environment Management. Provisions of the Swedish Work Environment Authority.
Papers on this website:
Applied research methods for development projects
RD1 – A case approach to study applied research methods
RD7 – On choice of "perspectives" when investigating complex phenomena
RD8 – Unclear reasons behind diverse perspectives in initial project plans
RD9 – On forming perspectives for innovative project planning. Examples from projects on supervision of work environment